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NOTE
SHOULD GOVERNMENT SPONSORED FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
RENDER JURISDICTION INVALID?
UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
INTRODUCTION
International treaty law requires that parties to a treaty act in good faith
in performing the various provisions of that treaty.1 Good faith performance
under extradition treaties requires that the forcible abduction of individuals
from a foreign country for the purpose of criminal prosecution in the United
States is an unacceptable means of obtaining jurisdiction. An individual is
forcibly abducted when they are illegally apprehended or kidnapped by
government agents and brought to the United States for the purpose of facing
criminal charges in the United States.2 The existence of an extradition treaty
between two countries dictates the means for bringing individuals from one
country to another for criminal prosecution.
Extradition is "the surrender by one state or country to another of an
individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and
within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try
and punish him, demands the surrender."' The United States and Mexico
are parties to an extradition treaty signed in Mexico City on May 4, 1978,
and ratified by both countries in 1979.' The obligations to extradite under
the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico reads,
1. The Contracting Parties agree to mutually extradite, subject to the
provisions of this Treaty, persons who the competent authorities of the re-
questing Party have charged with an offense or have found guilty of
committing an offense, or are wanted by said authorities to complete a
judicially pronounced penalty of deprivation of liberty for an offense
committed within the territory of the requesting Party. 2. For an offense
committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, the requested Party
shall grant extradition if: a) its [the requested Party's] laws would provide
for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances,
or b) the person sought is a national of the requesting Party, and that Party
has jurisdiction under its own laws to try that person.5
1. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-23 (1988).
2. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 271 (1974).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 585 (6th ed. 1990).
4. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059.
5. Id. at 5061-62.
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This preamble demonstrates a mutual agreement to abide by its terms in
extraditing people sought for criminal prosecution in the requesting country,
including the expressed requirement that those not extradited be prosecuted
in the requested country.
The treaty's purpose, as stated in its preamble, is: "The Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican
States; [d]esiring to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to
this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extradition; [h]ave
agreed as follows. .." To meet this purpose the countries included murder
and kidnapping among extraditable offenses in the treaty.7
Countries enter into extradition treaties to impose general legal
obligations on one another to surrender persons sought for criminal
prosecution.' For example, "[iln exchange for its legal promise to surrender
persons suspected or convicted of criminal activity to nation A in accordance
with the terms of the treaty, nation B obtains a reciprocal promise from A."'
A country is under no such obligation in the absence of an extradition
treaty.10 The consensual nature of the extradition agreement between the
United States and Mexico demonstrates a mutual respect for each nation's
territoriality, and sets forth the means for extraditing individuals from one
country to another. 1
The use of forcible abduction to obtain jurisdiction has been a repeated
practice of the United States since 1886.2 The use of forcible abduction
was initially approved of in 1886 in the case of Ker v. Illinois, where it was
held that if an extradition treaty has not been invoked a court may properly
6. Id. at 5061.
7. Id. at 5076. Other extraditable offenses include: malicious wounding of another;
abandonment of minors or other dependents where there is danger of injury or death; child
stealing; abduction; false imprisonment; rape; promoting or facilitating prostitution; robbery;
burglary; larceny; fraud; embezzlement; counterfeiting; forgery; extortion; arson; malicious
injury to property; offenses against the laws relating to the traffic in, possession, production,
manufacture, importation or exportation of dangerous drugs and chemicals; offenses against the
laws relating to the control of poisonous chemicals or substances injurious to health; piracy;
offenses against the safety of means of transportation including any act that would endanger a
person in a means of transportation; an offense relating to unlawful seizure or exercise of control
of trains, aircraft, vessels, or other means of transportation; offenses against the laws relating
to prohibited weapons, and the control of firearms, ammunition, explosives, incendiary devices,
or nuclear materials; an offense against the laws relating to international trade and transfers of
funds or valuable metals; an offense against the laws relating to the importation, exportation,
or international transit of goods, articles, or merchandise, including historic or archeological
items; violations of the customs laws; offenses against the laws relating to the control of
companies, banking institutions or other corporations; offenses against the laws relating to
prohibition of monopoly or unfair transactions; offenses against the laws relating to protection
of industrial property or copyright; offenses against the laws relating to abuse of official
authority. Id. at 5076-78.
8. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (1991).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (1992).
12. Kerv. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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exercise jurisdiction even though the defendant's presence is procured by
forcible abduction.13 This rule has been asserted by the United States in
numerous cases justifying the abduction of individuals wanted for prosecu-
tion.1'
This Note will analyze the practice of forcibly abducting individuals
from foreign countries for the purpose of their criminal prosecution in the
United States. This Note will focus on the reasoning behind the decisions
advocating forcible abduction and will give an overview of the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain" which
held that forcible abduction does not render jurisdiction improper so as to
prevent the individual from facing trial in the United States court for
violations of United States' criminal laws. Secondly, it will discuss possible
Constitutional due process violations resulting from obtaining jurisdiction by
forcible abduction. Finally, it considers international law and treaty law
violations stemming from this practice and concludes that the forcible
abduction of Alvarez-Machain violated both Constitutional due process rights
and international law.
I. BACKGROUND: UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAJN
Humberto Alvarez-Machain was a citizen and resident of Mexico. 6 He
was indicted for his involvement in the kidnapping and murder of United
States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique
Carnarena-Salazar (Camarena) and AIfredo Zavala-Avelar, Camarena's
pilot."7 The DEA believe that Alvarez-Machain, a medical doctor, partici-
pated in the murder of Camarena by prolonging his life so that others could
torture and interrogate him. 1'
DEA officials tried to have Alvarez-Machain turned over to the United
States via informal negotiations with Mexican officials but were not
successful. 9 The DEA officials offered a $50,000 reward and payment of
expenses in return for the delivery of Alvarez-Machain to the United
States.' In March, 1990, a DEA informant, Antonio Garate-Bustamante,
told DEA Special Agent Hector Berrellez, the chief investigator of the
Camarena murder, that his associates in Mexico could successfully apprehend
13. Id.
14. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); United States v. Marzano, 388 F. Supp.
906 (N.D. IU. 1975).
15. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
16. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-04 (C.D. Cal. 1990). This case
is the trial court level where Dr. Alvarez-Mahain was initially tried with other defendants in
the Camarena murder case.
20. Id.
1993]
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Alvarez-Machain.Y1 On April 2, 1990, Alvarez-Machain was forcibly
kidnapped from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico.' Five or six
armed men burst into Alvarez-Machain's office, one of them held a gun to
his head and told him to cooperate or he would be shot.' He was flown
to El Paso, Texas where he was arrested by DEA officials for his alleged
participation in the kidnapping and murder of Camarena.1 The District
Court, in United States v. Caro-Quintero, concluded that although the DEA
agents did not personally, physically abduct Alvarez-Machain, they were
"integrally involved" in the abduction. This involvement was demonstrated
by the reward offered for successfully abducting Alvarez-Machain, the DEA
approval of the abduction, the payment of $20,000 to the abductors after its
completion, and the relocation of many abductors and their families to the
United States including the payment of $6,000 per week for living expens-
es.25
Alvarez-Machain challenged his arrest, and moved to dismiss the
indictment, claiming that the United States District Court lacked jurisdiction
because the abduction violated the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico.' Though the extradition treaty does not expressly
prohibit the use of forcible abduction as a means of obtaining jurisdiction, the
District Court agreed and dismissed the case holding that it lacked jurisdic-
tion due to the treaty violation.' The District Court's decision was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'a which relied on its recent
decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.? The Ninth Circuit agreed
that the remedy for the treaty violation would be the dismissal of the indict-
ment and repatriation of Alvarez-Machain to Mexico."
The United States government appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to
the Supreme Court and certiorari was granted." The issue before the United
States Supreme Court was whether a criminal defendant can challenge the
21. Id.
22. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
23. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
24. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
25. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 609.
26. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
27. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 613-14. The court held that because the United States
acted unilaterally, without the participation or consent of the Mexican government, and the
Mexican government has registered an official protest to these actions, the United States violated
the extradition treaty by forcibly abducting Alvarez-Machan. The District Court distinguished
other cases where forcible abduction was held to be a reasonable means for gaining jurisdiction
by explaining that in those cases the acts of abduction were done without any authority from the
United States Government. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
28. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (1991).
29. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) The court held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican
national with the authorization or participation of the United States government violated the
extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico.
30. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1467.
31. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2188.
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jurisdiction of United States' courts on the grounds that he was forcibly
abducted to the United States from a nation with which the United States has
an extradition treaty. 2 This precise issue had never before been addressed
by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court, in a 6-3 decision delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held
that the extradition treaty did not prohibit forcible abductions as a means of
bringing Mexican nationals to the United States for criminal prosecution.3
The Court determined that because the language of the treaty does not
expressly prohibit forcible kidnapping or forbid the United States or Mexico
from bringing an individual from one country to the other for prosecution
outside of the express terms of the treaty, forcible abduction does not impair
the power of the court to try a person for a crime.' According to the
Court's interpretation of the treaty, extradition is not the only way that one
country can gain custody over a citizen of the other.' The Court relied on
the fact that Mexico was aware that the United States approved the practice
of forcible abduction established in the Ker case,' and that Mexico did not
negotiate a provision in the treaty prohibiting such conduct, and preventing
jurisdiction from being validly asserted under those circumstances.
In reaching its decision in Alvarez-Machain the Court largely relied on
the decision in Ker v. Illinois, which held that when an extradition treaty has
not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction even if the
defendant's presence was procured by forcible abduction.'
In Ker, the defendant, Frederick J. Ker, challenged the jurisdiction of
the United States to prosecute him on the ground that his presence was
obtained by forcible abduction from Peru." Though a warrant was drafted
to extradite Ker, it was not presented by the messenger sent by the United
States, who instead abducted him without United States government
approval.' Ker argued that both his due process rights and the extradition
treaty between the United States and Peru had been violated.4 The Court
disagreed, concluding that Ker did not suffer due process violations and the
extradition treaty was not violated. '2 The Court reasoned that despite the
manner utilized to bring him within the jurisdiction of the state of Illinois,
32. Id. at 2189.
33. Id. at 2196.
34. Id. at 2193-96.
35. Id. at 2194.
36. Ker, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
37. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194.
38. Ker, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id. at 438-39.
41. Id. at 439-40.
42. Id. at 436.
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Ker is liable to answer for a crime against the laws of the state so long as
there is a proper grand jury indictment and trial.'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor, differentiated the Alvarez-Machain issue from that decided in
Ker." The dissenters distinguished the abduction of Alvarez-Machain
authorized by the United States government from the abduction of Ker
carried out by a private kidnapper or bounty hunter without government
involvement.'
Justice Stevens stated that Alvarez-Machain, "involves this country's [the
United States] abduction of another country's citizen; it also involves a
violation of the territorial integrity of that other country, with which this
country has signed an extradition treaty."' The dissenters conclude that the
United States' involvement in the kidnapping constitutes a flagrant violation
of international law and a breach of our treaty obligations.47
II. FORCIBLE ABDUCTION AND DUE PROCESS
The Court in Alvarez-Machain seemingly ignored the issue of whether
Alvarez-Machain was deprived of his due process rights as a result of his
forcible abduction. This issue was addressed in Ker and expanded on by
later decisions." In Ker, the United States Supreme Court discussed
whether the forcible kidnapping of the defendant, outside the procedures set
out in an extradition treaty, deprived the defendant of due process rights
guaranteed in the Constitution.49
After charges were brought against Ker for larceny and embezzlement
in 1883, he was forcibly kidnapped from Peru to stand trial.' During the
trial, Ker presented a plea in abatement,5 that he was kidnapped from Peru
after the offenses were charged, and brought to the United States against his
will.52 In 1886, Frederick M. Ker was convicted of larceny and embezzle-
ment in a state court of Illinois, and appealed the conviction.53
43. Id. at 440.
44. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
45. Id. at 2203.
46. Id. at 2197.
47. Id. at 2203.
48. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); and United States ex rel.
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
49. Ker, 119 U.S. at 439-40.
50. Id. at 438.
51. Id. A plea in abatement in common pleading, is a plea which, without disputing the
merits of the [prosecution's] claim, objects to the place, mode, or time of asserting it . . . A
plea in abatement sets forth facts extrinsic to the merits which affect only the manner under
which the action is sought to be prosecuted, and does not destroy the right of action but merely
suspends or postpones its prosecution. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1151-52 (6th ed. 1990).
52. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
53. Id. at 436.
[Vol. 23
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The abduction came about after a request had been made by Governor
Hamilton of Illinois to the Secretary of State for a warrant requesting the
extradition of Ker from the Executive of Peru.' The President of the
United States issued the warrant directed to Henry G. Julian, as messenger,
to receive Ker from the authorities of Peru in compliance with the extradition
treaty between the two countries.5
Julian went to Peru, and, without presenting the warrant to the Peruvian
government, forcibly, with violence, arrested Ker.1 Julian placed Ker on
a U.S. ship and brought him to Honolulu where he was forced onto another
ship and brought to California. 7 Governor Hamilton made a requisition to
the Governor of California for the delivery of Ker to Illinois as a fugitive
from justice.- Ker was transferred to Cook County, Illinois, where he was
held for trial."
Ker argued in his pleading that from the time of his forcible arrest in
Peru until his delivery to authorities in Cook County, he was refused any
opportunity to communicate with any person or seek any legal advice.'
However, the Court found that Ker's due process rights had not been
violated because due process required only that the party: 1) be properly
indicted by a grand jury in the state court, 2) have a fair trial, and 3) not be
deprived of any rights he is lawfully entitled to during the trial."1 The
Court stated that unless there was some positive provision of the Constitution
or of the laws of the United States that was violated in bringing him into
court, there could not have been a due process violation.'
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires
"that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. "0 In the Ker decision, the Court stated that "mere irregularities in
the manner in which [an individual is] brought into the custody of the law"
does not constitute a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process so as
to require the dismissal of charges.' This narrow reading of the Fourteenth
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 438-39.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 439.
61. Id. at 440.
62. Id.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
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Amendment has been greatly altered and expanded by later court deci-
sions .65
A. Outrageous Conduct Exception
In the 1974 case of United States v. Toscanino, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified the issue by stating, "in
an era marked by a sharp increase in kidnapping activities, both here and
abroad, we face the question.., of whether a federal court must assume
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who is illegally apprehended
abroad and forcibly abducted by government agents to the United States for
the purpose of facing criminal charges here."67 The court stated that the
requirement of due process to obtain a conviction extends to the pretrial
conduct of law enforcement authorities." The court concluded that due
process requires a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over a defendant when
that person's presence was acquired "as the result of the government's
deliberate unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitu-
tional rights."I
In February, 1973, a citizen of Italy, Francisco Toscanino, and four
others were charged with conspiracy to import narcotics into the United
States.' Toscanino alleged that in January, 1973 he was lured from his
home in Montevideo, Uruguay by a telephone call from an Uruguayan police
officer. 1 Toscanino and his wife went to a deserted bowling alley and he
was attacked by seven men, knocked unconscious with a gun and thrown into
the rear seat of a car.' Later, Toscanino was brought to Brasilia where he
was tortured and interrogated for seventeen days.' The United States
government was aware of the interrogation and arrested Toscanino when he
was brought to New York at the end of January, 1973.1 Toscanino was
convicted at trial for conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics.7' He
appealed the decision and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing because the defendant had not sufficiently
established that he was abducted by or at the direction of United States
65. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
66. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 271.
68. Id. at 274.
69. Id. at 275.
70. Id. at 268.
71. Id. at 269.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 270.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 267.
[Vol. 23
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officials. 6 The court further stated that if Toscanino could establish that
United States officials were behind the kidnapping, the case should be
dismissed for lack of due process because, "where suppression of evidence
will not suffice [to meet due process requirements] ... the government
should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal conduct,... and when
an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction, the
court's acquisition of power over his person represents the government's
exploitation of its own misconduct."' By this, the court is saying that the
government cannot take advantage of its illegal method of bringing an
individual to the United States. Therefore to prevent its exploitation of the
illegally obtained individual, jurisdiction is deemed improper and the
individual should be returned to his country.
In reaching its decision the Second Circuit analyzed the decisions in Ker,
as well as the 1952 case of Frisbie v. Collins, stating that under the "Ker-
Frisbie Rule" (which says forcible abduction does not render jurisdiction
invalid), due process was limited to the guarantee of a constitutionally fair
trial, regardless of the method by which jurisdiction was obtained over the
defendant. 9 The court chose not to apply this narrow interpretation of due
process because in the twenty-two years between Frisbie and Toscanino the
Supreme Court had expanded its interpretation of due process so it is no
longer limited to just the guarantee of a fair trial.' The term due process
has been extended to "bar the government from realizing directly the fruits
of its own deliberate and unnecessary lawlessness in bringing the accused to
trial.""1 The expanded interpretation of due process developed in an effort
to deter illegal police conduct by barring the government from directly
utilizing the fruits of its own lawlessness.'
On remand, Toscanino alleged that he was abducted from his home by
Uruguarian police, and turned over to Brazilian police." Toscanino alleges
he was sedated and flown to the United States where DEA agents arrested
76. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 281.
77. Id. at 275.
78. 342 U.S. 519 (1952) in which the Supreme Court relied on the Ker ruling to find that
a defendant's due process rights were not violated when he was forcibly abducted in Chicago,
Illinois and brought to Michigan for criminal prosecution.
79. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272.
80. Id. See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
81. Id. (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-31 (1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 643 (1963); and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).
82. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272; see also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 674-75 (2d
Cir. 1973) in which the court stated that, "the court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it
has violated the law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress.
The aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong ... to maintain respect for law."
83. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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him." The court found that, assuming all allegations made by Toscanino
were true, there was no claim of United States participation in the abduction
or that it was carried out at the direction of United States officials.' The
court denied Toscanino's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and to
dismiss the indictment on jurisdictional grounds.'
The exception to the Ker-Frisbie ruling raised in Toscanino was revisited
shortly thereafter in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler.' In July,
1973, defendant Lujan was indicted for conspiracy to import and distribute
large quantities of heroin.' The warrant for Lujan's arrest called for any
special agent of the DEA, United States Marshal or Deputy Marshal to bring
him before the District Court for the Eastern District of New York.' This
warrant was enforced when he was taken into custody in October, 1973, by
Bolivian police acting as paid agents of the United States.' He was held
for a week and was not permitted to contact his embassy (Argentina), a
lawyer or his family.9' Lujan was then brought from Bolivia to New York
where he was formally arrested by federal agents.'
Following the Toscanino decision, Lujan challenged his being brought
to the United States via forcible abduction on due process grounds.' The
court reviewed its decision in Toscanino and explained that it did not
eviscerate the Ker-Frisbie rule, but merely expanded due process to protect
individuals brought to the United States from abroad by the use of torture,
brutality and similar outrageous conduct." The Toscanino ruling should not
be interpreted to mean that entry into the United States by any irregular
circumstances renders jurisdiction improper." Therefore, the decision in
Lujan limited the Toscanino rule to cases where the abduction by United
States officials was accompanied by outrageous conduct.9 The court
explained that outrageous conduct is defined as, "that which offends those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking people, to shock the conscience, and to offend a sense of
justice."'
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 510 F.2d 62 (1975).
88. Id. at 63.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 64.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 65. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1952)).
[Vol. 23
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This outrageous conduct exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule was further
explained as applying to situations where the conduct of United States law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." This
means that the where the government uses outrageous conduct in apprehend-
ing an individual, jurisdiction over the individual is invalid and the
government is prevented from gaining the benefit of their illegal conduct
through judicial processes (grand jury indictments and fair trials) which the
government could hide behind under the Ker-Frisbie rule. The Lujan court
stated that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine did not prevent judicial scrutiny of
government conduct which is outrageous and reprehensible." The court
explained, using language from the Toscanino decision, that "[a]ny other
approach.. .would be inconsistent with cases refusing to permit the govern-
ment to benefit from illegal police conduct in obtaining evidence. " "
The outrageous conduct exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule was again
raised a year later in United States v. Marzano."1  Pasquale Charles
Marzano and his co-defendant Luigi Michael DiFonzo argue that their
forcible abduction from the British West Indies in October, 1974 violated
their due process rights. 1" The defendants were indicted for stealing
approximately 4.3 million dollars from the headquarters of the Purolator
Company in Chicago.'W The F.B.I. located them on Grand Cayman Island
in the British West Indies and contacted them."' The defendants met with
agents of the F.B.I. and they boarded a plane for Miami when asked to do
so by a local police officer."° The defendants did not resist boarding the
flight and the agents did not actively involve themselves in the process of
returning them to the United States. 6 F.B.I. agents arrested Marzano and
DiFonzo when they arrived in Miami."°
The court in Marzano distinguished Toscanino with regard to the
outrageous conduct used in the abduction of Toscanino. °m Marzano was
asked by Detective Superintendent Derrick Tricker, a Grand Cayman police
officer, to board the plane going to Miami. 109 Marzano did not resist
boarding the plane and the FBI was not actively involved in his return to the
98. Id.
99. Id. at 64.
100. Id. (citing Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272).
101. 388 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. IU. 1975).
102. Id. at 907.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 907.
106. Id.
107. Id. at906.
108. Id. at 909.
109. Id. at907.
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United States."' No force was used whatsoever."' By contrast, Tos-
canino was knocked unconscious with a gun, bound and blindfolded, and
thrown into the rear seat of a car.1 2 He was tortured, and denied sleep
and nourishment for days before being flown to New York."1 3 Further,
Toscanino asserted that the United States government was aware of this
conduct. 114
The court in Marzano found no due process violations. The court held
there was no outrageous conduct involved in Marzano's return to the United
States.115 The court, however, reiterated that whenever a foreign national
is abducted or kidnapped from outside the United States and is forcibly
brought into this country by United States agents using means of torture,
brutality or similar physical abuse, the federal court acquires no jurisdiction
over him because of a violation of due process.1 6 The court further stated
that the Ker-Frisbie rule is still applicable in the determination of a court's
jurisdiction over defendants who have been returned to the United States
against their will." 7 The Toscanino decision only applies in cases where,
"an egregious factual situation involving torture, brutality, or some form of
official protest to the violation of an extradition treaty by a foreign govern-
ment."
118
B. Applicability of Outrageous Conduct Exception to Alvarez-Machain
The question for the Alvarez-Macham Court, if they had adopted the
Toscanino-Lujan rule, would be one of degree. If those who kidnapped
Humberto Alvarez-Machain acted with outrageous conduct, the United States
Court would not have proper jurisdiction over Alvarez-Machain because his
due process rights would have been violated. The circumstances of the
abduction of Alvarez-Machain are as follows: five or six armed men burst
into Dr. Alvarez-Machain's office. 9 One placed a gun to his head telling
him to cooperate or be shot."2 He was taken from his office to a house
in Guadalajara.1 21 When he exited the car one of the men hit him in the
stomach.1" He was forced to lay face down on the floor in the house for
110. Id. at 908.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 910.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 910.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Caro-Qidntero, 745 F. Supp. at 605.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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two to three hours.1" Alvarez-Machain alleged that he also was shocked
six or seven times and injected twice with a substance that made him feel
dizzy.12' Later he was forced on a plane and flown to El Paso, Texas."zs
In addressing these allegation, the District Court found that these acts, if
true, "do not constitute acts of such barbarism as to warrant dismissal of the
indictments."" However, this author believes that the nature and extent
of the abuse inflicted on Alvarez-Machain was outrageous and comparable
to that inflicted on Toscanino, and, as it was done with the knowledge and
agreement of the United States government, it should have been found to be
a due process violation.
Currently, only the Second Circuit adheres to the Toscanino-Lujan
exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule."z The Second Circuit rule has followed
the line of decisions expanding due process protection to keep states from
exercising jurisdiction gained through an indisputably illegal act." If the
United States Supreme Court adopted the Toscanino-Lujan rule it would
increase the protection of individuals from abusive or outrageous conduct by
United States law enforcement individuals. The United States government
would either have to follow procedural guidelines expressed in extradition
treaties, or at least not act outrageously when forcibly bringing individuals
to the United States for prosecution. The limitation is minor, only protecting
those being taken into custody from outrageous conduct by the United States
Government or its agent. This safeguard is both logical and necessary to
protect both individuals being taken into custody from abuse, and the
integrity of the United States in the international arena.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF TREATIES
The law of treaties serves a similar function in international law as does
the law of contracts in municipal or national law."' It sets forth rules
regarding the making, effect, amendment, invalidity, and termination of
agreements among countries. 130
Article 77 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states,
"Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 605.
127. Lujan, 510 F.2d at 65 ("the courts of other circuits have continued to adhere to the Ker-
Frisbie rle").
128. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272.
129. Janis, supra note 1, at 14.
130. Id. at 14-15.
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performed by them in good faith."' The Vienna Convention is largely
a codification of the existing international law of treaties.132  Though the
United States is not formally a party to the convention, the U.S. Department
of State recognizes it as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice." 3 In addition to requiring Parties to perform their treaty obliga-
tions in good faith, the Vienna Convention states that a, "State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat [the treaty's] object and purpose.""
A. Good Faith and Treaty Obligations
Good faith encompasses honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to
defraud, and being faithful to one's duty or obligation. 35 This "duty or
obligation" in the Extradition Treaty stems from the purpose of the treaty as
stated in the preamble: "The Government of the United States and the
Government of Mexico desiring to cooperate more closely in the fight against
crime and, to this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of
extradition. " 136
The United States courts may not acquire jurisdiction over an individual
wanted for prosecution in the United States by means of a treaty viola-
tion. 37 It follows then that the appropriate inquiry into the validity of a
court's jurisdiction in cases such as Alvarez-Machain is whether there has
been a violation of the extradition treaty. 13
Extradition treaty provisions are included to protect a nations sovereign-
ty. 3' If a nation determines its sovereign interests have been violated and
files an official protest, redress from the violating nation may be re-
quired." Courts have repeatedly held that a violation of an extradition
treaty and international law can be raised as a defense only if the nation
131. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969),
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INTL. L. 875, 884 (1969) (drafted in 1966; signed and adopted at Vienna
May 23, 1969; entered into force January 27, 1980, not in force for the United States. The
Vienna Convention is the international law "Treaty on Treaties.")
132. Janis, supra note 1, at 15 explaining that the Vienna Convention is largely a codification
of customary international law. Custom has developed as a source of law through the
consideration of international state practices as implicit consent to the creation and application
of international legal rules.
133. Id.
134. Vienna Convention, supra note 130.
135. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 477 (6th ed. 1990).
136. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, Mex.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5061.
137. United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1957), cert denied, 355 U.S. 873
(1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 920 (1958).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Zabanch, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988).
140. Id.
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where the individual was taken from objected to the means of gaining the
person's presence in the United States.14
In United States v. Zabaneh,1 2 Angel John Zabaneh, a citizen of
Belize, was forcibly abducted from Guatemala in November, 1985, and taken
to the United States to be prosecuted under a drug trafficking indictment."
The Fifth Circuit held that because neither Belize nor Guatemala objected to
the abduction, Zabaneh could not successfully claim the extradition treaty
was violated.1" In the Alvarez-Machain case, the Mexican government
formally demanded on at least two separate occasions that Alvarez-Machain
be returned to Mexico." s Under the Zabaneh decision, and the decisions
in many other cases, Alvarez-Machain should be allowed to raise the treaty
violation as a defense because, as the court in Zabaneh explained, "[tireaties
are contracts between or among independent nations... [with] provi-
sions... designed to protect the sovereign interests of nations, ... [so] it
is up to the offended nations to determine whether a violation of sovereign
interests occurred and require redress."" 4' When Mexico protested
Alvarez-Machain's removal to the United States, it asserted such a violation
of sovereign interests and, thus, the issue is a viable one for redress.
The Court in Alvarez-Machain held that there was not a treaty violation
because the treaty does not expressly forbid forcible abduction." In
reaching this decision, the Court ignored customary international law, and
the decisions of cases which state that when the Nation/party requested to
extradite formally protests the abduction of its citizen, the violation of
international law and the treaty may be raised as a defense to jurisdic-
tion.'" By analogy, because Mexico objected to the abduction on at least
two occasions, international law and treaty violations were validly raised.
The Majority decision in Alvarez-Machain disregarded these objections and
the violations which flowed from them when it followed the Ker-Frisbie rule
to determine that jurisdiction is valid despite the nullifying effect the decision
has on the Extradition Treaty's effectiveness, as either country now may
disregard the treaty and kidnap individual sought for prosecution1.
141. See United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (1981); United States v. Zabaneh, 837
F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989); United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1520 (11th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 347 (1992).
142. 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988).
143. Id. at 1252.
144. Id. at 1261.
145. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
146. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d at 1261. See also United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
147. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
148. See Reed, 639 F.2d at 902; Zabaneh, 837 F.2d at 1261); Diwan, 864 F.2d at 721;
Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d at 1520.
149. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198.
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The good faith obligations inherent in treaty performance would dictate
that the United States follow the terms it consented to upon ratifying the
treaty." The majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the actions by
the United States were outside of the treaty and therefore not a violation.151
This ignores the requirement that the United States fulfill its treaty agree-
ments in good faith.
The United States-Mexico extradition treaty appears to be designed to
cover the entire subject of extradition from the preamble, through the other
Articles previously discussed.152 It does this by covering the entire extradi-
tion process: listing the crimes extraditable, procedures for extradition, and
the remedy a party to the agreement refuses to extradite.'" The United
States ratified the extradition treaty on May 4, 1979.11 Therefore, The
United States Government had a good faith duty to obtain Alvarez-Machain
under the terms of the treaty. "The principle of good faith requires parties
to a transaction to deal honestly and fairly with each other, to represent their
motives and purposes truthfully, and to refrain from taking unfair advantage,
that might result from a literal and unintended interpretation of the agreement
between them.""
The Mexican government, on at least two occasions, complained of
treaty violations and demanded Alvarez-Machain's return to Mexico. 5
Mexico's good faith performance of the terms of the treaty is shown by the
expressed intent to prosecute Alvarez-Machain pursuant to Article Nine of
the extradition treaty. 57 Article 23 of the treaty includes a clause that
either Party to the Treaty can terminate the agreement by giving the other
party six months notice of termination." Otherwise, the treaty is a
consensual, binding agreement which should be respected, making non-
consensual extradition outside of its terms a violation. The remedy would
be the repatriation of Alvarez-Machain. '
150. Janis, supra note 1, at 25.
151. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
152. Id. at 2198.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2190.
155. 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (1984).
156. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
157. Id.
158. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, Mex.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5074.
159. Janis, supra note 1, at 9.
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B. Article Nine of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty
Article Nine of the United States/Mexico extradition treaty explains the
means of extradition mutually consented to by both the United States and
Mexico." Article Nine states:
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own
nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party shall,
if not prevented by the laws of the Party, have the power to deliver
them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its component
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has
jurisdiction over the offense. 61
Treaty interpretation should be done in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their context and in the light of
the treaty's object and purpose."t The Vienna Convention dictates that the
plain meaning interpretation of express treaty terms should be given great
emphasis, even to the exclusion of the circumstances in which the agreement
was made and its legislative history." Therefore, the plain meaning of the
terms of the treaty should be controlling in its interpretation.
In interpreting Article Nine, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
manifest purpose of the Article is to preserve each nation's right not to have
its own nationals tried in the courts of the other without consent.'" Instru-
mental to that purpose is the reserved right not to extradite." The second
option under Article Nine of the extradition treaty addresses the requirements
of the Party refusing to extradite.'" If Mexico elected not to extradite
Alvarez-Machain, Article Nine, Section Two would require the submission
of the case to its government authorities for prosecution. 6
In both Alvarez-Machain and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez the
U.S. government argued that Article Nine of the U.S./Mexico extradition
treaty is not the only legitimate way for a person to be brought into the
160. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, Mex.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
161. Id. at 5065.
162. Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 31(1).
163. Janis, supra note 1, at 25-26.
164. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350.
165. Id.
166. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, Mex.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
167. Id.
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United States for criminal prosecution.'" In the Verdugo-Urquidez deci-
sion the Ninth Circuit held that unless Mexico had the opportunity to exercise
both options of Article Nine other means of extradition would violate the
treaty."6 The government's argument would render Article Nine a point-
less formality because either party to the treaty could disregard the express
extradition procedures and simply abduct the individual they seek to
prosecute. "
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain, explains
that the Majority's decision makes a nullity of many Articles of the
Extradition Treaty, in addition to Article Nine.17 The United States
argued that the Treaty is not exclusive, and permits forcible abduction, as the
"requesting" state can disregard these discretionary articles and simply
kidnap the individual sought for prosecution, because it does not expressly
disallow it."7 This reading of the Treaty, as explained in Justice Stevens'
dissenting opinion, makes the following provisions useless: 1. sufficient
evidence to grant extradition (Art. 3); 2. withholding extradition for political
or military offenses (Art. 5); 3. withholding extradition when the person
sought has already been tried (Art. 6); 4. withholding extradition when the
statute of limitations for the crime has lapsed (Art. 7); 5. and granting the
requested State discretion to refuse to extradite an individual who would face
the death penalty in the requesting country (Art.8). "
The DEA and Mexican officials had formally negotiated for the
extradition of Alvarez-Machain. '1 The DEA agents on behalf of the
United States government refused to front any money needed for the
extradition after Mexican authorities requested $50,000 to cover the expenses
of transporting Alvarez-Machain, though later the DEA offered a $50,000
reward plus expenses for Alvarez-Machain's return to the United States. 75
Mexican officials attempted to meet with DEA agents again to negotiate the
extradition, but this meeting was canceled by the DEA agents. 6 Alvarez-
Machain was forcibly abducted without any further meetings between agents
of the two countries. 1"
Under the provisions of Article Nine, when the extradition negotiations
failed, Mexico was required to prosecute Alvarez-Machain in its own
168. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191; Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350.
169. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350.
170. Id.
171. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602.
175. Id. at 602-03.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 603.
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courts.1" The forcible abduction of Alvarez-Machain authorized by the
United States government prevented Mexico from performing its require-
ments under the second option of Article Nine. Because Mexico was
prevented from exercising one of its options under Article Nine, the United
States involvement in the abduction constituted a violation of the treaty.'"
CONCLUSION
Due process concerns have been greatly expanded by the United States
Supreme Court since Ker. Protection from outrageous conduct by govern-
ment authorities has become the cornerstone of due process interpretation.
The Second Circuit's Toscanino-Lujan exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule,
made abduction accompanied by outrageous conduct a violation of due
process. The outrageous conduct exception dictates the dismissal of
charges, 1" and protects this expanded due process purpose by ensuring that
the government cannot take advantage of its own illegal conduct. This
exception should be applied by the Supreme Court in the case at hand
because it enforces those protections developed via the Court's many due
process holdings. 1"
The fact that the United States entered into a consensual extradition
treaty with Mexico demonstrates that the treaty is the sole means by which
individuals wanted for prosecution in one of the countries should be obtained.
International law, expressed by the Vienna Convention, dictates that the
express terms of a treaty be interpreted in good faith. '
The acceptance of forcible abduction as a means of gaining Alvarez-
Machain's presence in United States' courts, without regard for the
extradition treaty, demonstrates bad faith performance of treaty obligations
because a good faith interpretation of its terms would dictate following the
procedural guidelines for extradition set forth in the treaty. Such bad faith
performance accompanied by an express complaint by the Mexican
government requires the return of Alvarez-Machain to Mexico because it
invokes the treaty's procedures.
178. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, Mex.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065.
179. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1350.
180. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 at 275.
181. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973).
182. Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 31(1).
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PosrscRIPr: THE TRIAL OF ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
On December 2, 1992 the trial of Dr. Alvarez-Machain for his alleged
participation in the torture and killing of Enrique Camarena began. 1" The
United States government accused Alvarez-Machain and a co-defendant,
Ruben Zuno Arce, of participating in a conspiracy to kidnap, torture and kill
Camarena.' 8 '
On December 14, 1992 Judge Edward Rafeedie of the United States
District Court decided that the evidence presented against Alvarez-Machain
"had been based on hunches and the wildest speculation and had failed to
support the charge that he had participated in the torture of" Camarena."
Judge Rafeedie "threw out" the charges against Alvarez-Machain based on
this lack of evidence." Following the dismissal Dr. Alvarez-Machain
returned home to Guadalajara, Mexico. 1'
The district court opinion found that the United States had no evidence
linking Dr. Alvarez-Machain to the murder of Camerena. The Supreme
Court holding that the forcible abduction of an individual, in lieu of
following the express provisions of an extradition treaty is an acceptable
means of obtaining jurisdiction over a person wanted for prosecution in the
United States, remains the law in the United States in such cases.
Jonathan E. Katz
183. Mexican Doctor Goes on Trial in Agent's Slaying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1992, at A17.
184. Id.
185. Seth Mydans, Judge Clear's Mexican in Agent's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, De. 15, 1992,
at A20.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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